Standing Committee F

[Mr. Derek Conway in the Chair]

Justice (Northern Ireland) Bill

Derek Conway: Before we begin, I want to draw hon. Members' attention to an error in the amendment paper. New clause 5, tabled by Mr. Mallon, appears as a new clause relating to part 4. Instead, it should appear as a new clause relating to part 5. It has not been selected for today's business in any case, as it is starred.Clause 53 Aims of youth justice system

Clause 53 - Aims of youth justice system

Amendment proposed [7 February]: No. 278, in page 30, line 31, leave out subsection (1) and insert— 
'( ) The principal aim of the youth justice system in Northern Ireland is to prevent offending by children and to promote the child's reintegration and the child assuming a constructive role in society. 
 ( ) Every child in contact with the law shall be treated in a manner consistent with the promotion of the child's sense of dignity and worth, reinforcing the child's respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of others.'.—[Lembit Öpik.]
 Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.

Derek Conway: I remind the Committee that with this we are taking the following amendments: No. 223, in page 30, line 32, after 'children', insert
'having taken into account the best interests of the child as the paramount consideration, as identified in the United Nations Conventions on the Rights of the Child; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; The United Nations Guidelines for the prevention of Juvenile delinquency; the United Nations Standard minimum for the Administration of Youth Justice and the United Nations Guidelines for the protection of juveniles deprived of their liberty.'.
 No. 264, in page 30, line 32, after 'children', insert 'and young persons'. 
 No. 277, in page 30, line 37, leave out 'welfare' and insert 'best interests'. 
 No. 284, in page 30, line 41, at end insert— 
'(3A) All persons with responsibility for the youth justice system shall have regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.'.

Seamus Mallon: I thank the hon. Member for Montgomeryshire (Lembit Öpik) for moving the amendment on Thursday last, in my unavoidable absence. It was most interesting to read the report, which gives a certain flavour of attitudes.
 I will be pretty brief, because the debate has already taken place. My three amendments try to fulfil the obligations of recommendation 169 of the review group, which was that 
''a clear statement of the aims of the juvenile justice system''
 should be developed, agreed and incorporated in legislation. The clause attempts to do that, but it is 
 parsimonious and lacks the detail and humanity that one would expect on the issue. In many ways, it has a turn-of-the-century tone about it—and I am not talking about the last century. Although I recognise the validity of what the Minister has said and will say about stating the aims, I ask him to consider the importance of the issue—I know that he has—and to try to reflect its importance by agreeing to the amendments. 
 In a Bill such as this, it is important that we ensure that the wording reflects the challenges that we face and the world that we live in. It is not adequate simply to state the principles in bare terms, as the Government do. That is deficient, because it does not expand on them as it might. It is also incomplete, as it ignores several elements that the review group felt should be included among the aims. I know that they will be dealt with—somewhat parsimoniously, I suggest—in other parts of the clause. 
 I have no quarrel with the aim of the prevention of offending and the encouragement of children to take responsibility for their actions, but the provisions should deal with the rehabilitation of the offender, which they do not. Nor do they deal with the duty to regard the best interests of the child as a primary consideration, in accordance with article 3 of the United Nations convention on the rights of the child. That convention is the most widely adhered to of all international human rights instruments. It is unacceptable for its fundamental provisions to be ignored when the principles of a system of justice intended to deal with children are under consideration. It will be argued that those principles are reflected elsewhere in the Bill—I do not dispute that—and that they are presented in practical terms—I do not dispute that either. However, I believe that the principles have such weight and importance that they should be stated clearly in the clause. 
 The amendments derive from the views put forward by the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission in its submission to the Northern Ireland Assembly. Its approach was accepted by all the political parties. It is important for the relationship between the Administration and the Human Rights Commission, the Equality Commission and all the other agencies to be such that the more we respect and reflect their views, the stronger the legislation becomes. Their input does not weaken its objectives; it strengthens them. Rather than the negative function that is implied in subsections (1), (2) and (3), the justice system should have the positive function of reintegrating children into society and enabling them to play a constructive part in future. That is crucial. 
 It will be argued that the amendment is redundant, and that those aims are stated elsewhere. So be it. However, those aims are so important that we should live with the possible redundancy and include a declaration of our intent.

Tony McWalter: My hon. Friend has anticipated one of the counter-arguments to his assertion. Does he agree that the best thing that we can do for a young person who has a strong propensity to offend is to get him to the stage at which that propensity is much weaker? Subsection (2)
 promotes the development of conscience in young people. Surely that is doing the right thing both for the young person and for the wider society.

Seamus Mallon: I could not disagree with a word that my hon. Friend has said. However, I am attempting to ensure that the tone changes and, with it, the declaration of intent in the legislation to make those aims a priority, which the clause does not seem to make them. We must ensure that children in the justice system are treated with dignity, and that all actions taken within the system are taken with the best interests of the child firmly in mind, not just his welfare.
 I do not want to argue about semantics, but there is a substantial difference between welfare and best interests. Welfare is the fulfilling of responsibilities in a fairly cold way, whereas dealing with a young person's best interests goes beyond that. I know that hon. Members who have dealt with young people will recognise that substantive difference. 
 The amendment is important because it provides a declaration of intent. It sets out not only what we shall do, but what our approach will be. The tone that it gives the Bill could help us to achieve our aims. 
 I believe that amendment No. 286 was grouped with the present amendments on Thursday, and, if I may—

Derek Conway: Order. It might help the hon. Gentleman to know that amendment No. 286 has been grouped with amendment No. 227 under clause 54, and we shall come to it later. I will allow a reasonable amount of wandering, but we should bear in mind the fact that amendment No. 286 is in the next group.

Seamus Mallon: I thank you most sincerely for that guidance, Mr. Conway, which gave me time to remember what I was going to say about the amendment.
 I shall conclude by asking the Minister carefully to reconsider the amendments. Nothing in them runs contrary to the Bill's wording or objectives or to the direction that it must take. Yes, there is a softening of tone and a little more humanity in them, but it is crucial that we enshrine the UN principles, which take us away from what I called the turn-of-the-century approach and places the issue in a different context, from which it can only benefit.

Edward Garnier: I shall be brief because we have until one o'clock to discuss 13 clauses, about 80 amendments, some schedules and, possibly, some new clauses.
 I want to respond, in particular, to the hon. Gentleman's remarks about legislation containing statements of intent, a matter on which I briefly touched before the weekend. Sentencing policies change quite frequently, and the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Woolf, has quite radically changed them in the past four or five weeks. Hon. Members may have read about this in the newspapers, but I clearly remember him saying that those who were guilty of street robbery or of stealing mobile telephones should go to prison 
 for a long time. Indeed, he increased the sentence of someone who had stolen a mobile telephone to five years. 
 As we know, most street crime is committed by youngsters, and there has now been a radical change in the way in which the courts are required to consider the issue. This year, the Lord Chief Justice has also said that, wherever possible, young mothers should not be sentenced to prison. That, again, is a change in sentencing policy, and the Court of Appeal criminal division is constraining the way in which the courts exercise their discretion in sentencing.

Seamus Mallon: The hon. and learned Gentleman makes the important point that sentencing policies change. Is it not, therefore, all the more important that principles, which do not change, should be made explicit in legislation such as this?

Edward Garnier: I take an entirely different view. Legislation is not the place for statements of intent, which are to be found in policy documents, party political manifestos and papers provided by jurists and others. They should not be placed in statute.
 Not only do sentencing policies change, in accordance with declarations by the senior judiciary, but so do Government responses to criminal behaviour. The ways in which the present and previous Governments have dealt with aspects of criminal behaviour have changed from time to time. Usually, in my experience, Government responses to changes in public concern are somewhat delayed and it sometimes takes as long as five years for a criminal justice Act to be passed to bring about change reflecting those concerns. None the less, I have given two examples of the constantly moving scene. By setting in stone the amendment or subsections (1), (2) and (3) we would not do any service to the courts, the Government or those whom we seek to serve. 
 That lesson was brought home to me at the weekend when I attended a Judicial Studies Board tuition course—one of the refresher courses that recorders attend. I was constantly reminded, as the only recorder at the seminar who was also a Member of Parliament, that much of the criminal justice legislation passed by the House is difficult to apply and does not adequately take account of what has happened before. The result is increasingly meaningless legislation. An article in issue 3 of ''Sentencing News'', for 15 November 2000, concludes: 
''Legislators seem to be unable to learn the lesson that statutes which no one can understand cannot be put into effective operation.''
 I do not suggest that the amendments or subsections (1), (2) and (3) are impossible to understand, but they are coming close, as I said last week, to being as useless as an early-day motion. 
 I was rebuked by the Minister on Thursday afternoon, at column 292, for failing to read the criminal justice review. I am not prepared to accept a rebuke from the Minister, whether it is right or wrong. It was wrong, in fact. In my role as shadow Attorney-General I studied the criminal justice review as it was 
 published before the general election. I may even have come to it before the Minister. I cannot claim to have his detailed knowledge of it, but the points that I am making are outside that context. Simply repeating paragraphs from the review does not add to the quality of the argument that we need to get to grips with in this Committee if we are to produce effective measures. 
 Nothing in what the Minister said on Thursday afternoon comes close to being an answer to the points that I raised then. I am not making a party political point, but arguing that we need increasingly to be on our guard. We need to ensure that measures passed by the House, particularly on criminal justice matters, have some utility and effectiveness, instead of amounting to a collection of ill-thought-out amendments to earlier measures, or warm words that will make us feel good but fail to achieve our aims. 
 I of course accept that the aim of the youth justice system must reflect either the content of the amendments or the subsections that I have attacked. However, we do not need those provisions in the Bill. They will not help the sentencers to deal with the youngsters who come before them, nor will they help the people who write the pre-sentence reports. They will be hobbled and will produce a formulaic report. 
 After the Bill is passed, the probation service or whoever writes the pre-sentence reports in Northern Ireland will, almost as if setting out a computer matrix, write reports that reflect subsections (1), (2) and (3). The reports will then deal with the meat of the case, consider what should be done with a particular child or young person and pay no more attention to the aims set out in clause 53. They will not ignore those aims because they will always be in the mind of, and second nature to, the sentencer, but I assure the Committee that the amendment would be of no assistance whatsoever in securing proper sentences or treatment for young people, custodial or non-custodial—and I hope that, in the case of young people, they will be predominantly non-custodial. 
 From my experience, from the criticisms that have been expressed to me by those who are far more experienced than me in the practice of sentencing, from my understanding of the way in which legislation is, increasingly, being constructed in this House, and despite the Government's best intentions, as well as those of the two leading proponents of the amendments, I can assure them that they are barking up a tree that will produce no fruit.

Lembit Öpik: We have had an extensive debate, which has, arguably, lasted for five days with a short break. I have listened to hon. Members' views and it is even clearer to me now that it was last week that we are, in fact, discussing the direction that we want the youth justice system to take.
 The hon. Member for Newry and Armagh (Mr. Mallon) underlined the binary option before us. One option is to continue in much the same vein as before. The other is to take a new approach, which regards youth offending as a symptom rather than a cause, and thus the solution as being much deeper and more profoundly connected with the treatment of the 
 human condition than clause 53(1) would imply. As the Minister rightly said, one can make the case that those considerations are incorporated in part 4, in which case we are arguing about a matter of emphasis, but that emphasis is crucial. If we apply the 20-year rule and ask what someone will think of the legislation in 20 years' time, I believe that they will naturally look at clause 53 to ascertain the principal intent of this part of the Bill. That is what I am asking the Committee to consider. 
 As I said last week, if young people are not treated fairly, with understanding and in a way that is appropriate to their age, and, worse still, if they are put into an unsuitable environment in which their educational needs are not met and their behaviour is not challenged but simply punished, I am sure that society will reap the results later and that it will cost more in the long run. 
 The principle underlying amendments Nos. 278 and 284, and the other amendments in the group, is that rather than giving passive consideration to such matters, one should actively commit to rehabilitation, on the assumption that it will reduce reoffending and aid the prevention of crime more effectively than discussing sentencing, as the hon. and learned Member for Harborough (Mr. Garnier) has just done. The emphasis in the United Kingdom has been wrong for a long time. I am sure that we would all agree that the paramount consideration is to protect the public, but I would argue that the best way to achieve that is by putting the rights of the child first and by measuring the success of our intervention from the change in crime rates. 
 The hon. Member for Hemel Hempstead (Mr. McWalter), who sadly is not here at the moment, made an interesting point. I asked the hon. Member for Newry and Armagh whether we did not want the strong propensity to offend to become a weaker propensity to offend. Yes we do want that, but putting it like that implies that we can somehow go straight to that point. We should consider the matter in another way. We want to turn a weak association with mainstream society into a strong one, so we should start at a different point and, rather than simply suppressing the desire to offend, we should nurture the desire to participate positively in society. 
 I return to the main point of the amendments. The hon. and learned Member for Harborough said some interesting things; he said that most crime was committed by youngsters, which is certainly an interesting statement, and that prison sentencing policy had changed. He talked a lot about sentencing, and we suggest that the kind of argument that he was making is exactly what the clause would lead Northern Ireland into. Amendment No. 278 would make us ask, instead, ''What do we have to do to stop young people from reoffending? How do we persuade an individual that he wants to play a constructive part in society?'' In that case, the requirement to suppress criminal tendencies would diminish. 
 The hon. and learned Gentleman said that the amendment was as useless as an early-day motion, which shows that this is not a moot debate. The 
 amendments are not as useless as an early-day motion, but suggest that we should handle Northern Ireland youth justice in a different way from how it is handled anywhere else.

Edward Garnier: I am breaching my own injunction to be brief by interrupting the hon. Gentleman, but I think that he may be confused. Of course, we want diversionary activities to prevent youngsters from offending, but the work of the youth justice system consists of catching people when they have committed offences. That is why I talked about sentencing, which does not have to mean sending youngsters to prison or young offenders institutions—it simply means dealing with them through the court system. Diversionary activities happen as much through education and parental guidance as anything else, and they should surely not have to happen through the youth justice system.

Lembit Öpik: In actual fact, the hon. and learned Gentleman has saved me time, because he lucidly described the choice that the Committee needs to make. If the Committee agrees that the youth justice system as described in the Bill should purely be concerned with what we do when young people have offended—and, on a secondary level, with what parents might have done to prevent the offence—it should vote against the amendment. If, however, like myself, my hon. Friend the Member for Cheadle (Mrs. Calton) and the hon. Member for Newry and Armagh, the Committee feels that the
''principal aim of the youth justice system in Northern Ireland is to . . . promote the child's reintegration and the child assuming a constructive role in society'',
 as the amendment says, it must recognise that that view is not adequately represented in the clause. That is the choice that faces us. 
 I want to end by giving a practical example of why the Committee should agree with the amendments. I have had some association with an organisation called Youth at Risk, which has embodied and tested the concept of tough love. That sounds a bit woolly and namby-pamby—letting kids off the hook by loving them and hugging them, to make them better people. The organisation says, however, that rather than simply creating a mindset of criminality in offenders, such a strategy gets deep inside the motivations of offenders and gives them the option to choose a different route. The statistics that the organisation has shown me in terms of reoffence are absolutely phenomenal, showing a reduction in reoffending to a fraction of its normal level. Therefore, we can see evidence that the amendments would achieve the result that we all want, by protecting the public by preventing children from offending, and ensure that those children become constructive members of society. 
 The arguments have been presented. I respect the Minister's remarks and I hope that hon. Members understand that there is an important decision to be made on an issue of principle. For that reason, Mr. Conway, I hope that you will allow us to have separate votes on amendments Nos. 278 and 284. There is no 
 point in voting on the other amendments in the group, because all of the issues are adequately summarised by those two amendments. Now that we have had a constructive debate on the matter, I ask the Committee to consider what has been said and vote accordingly.

Derek Conway: Order. Following the request made by the hon. Member for Montgomeryshire, I shall put the question on amendment No. 278 when the debate on this group has concluded. The Committee will have an opportunity to divide on amendment No. 284 after we have disposed of the next group of amendments. At that stage, I shall ask the hon. Member for Newry and Armagh to move that amendment formally.
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 4, Noes 19.

Question accordingly negatived.

Patsy Calton: I beg to move amendment No. 224, in page 30, line 41, at end insert—
'(3A) A Guardian ad Litem will be appointed for the child in all cases where custody is a possible outcome of Court proceedings.'.

Derek Conway: With this it will be convenient to consider amendment No. 252, in Clause 57, page 43, line 25, after 'representative', insert 'or Guardian ad Litem'.
 Amendment No. 259, in Clause 61, page 56, line 9, after 'solicitor', insert 'or Guardian ad Litem'.

Patsy Calton: I shall try to be brief. Others have suggested that a guardian ad litem should be appointed in order to protect the interests of young people. Interestingly, I have a different perspective on the matter from that of youth groups in Northern Ireland, because I have chaired a local authority social services committee, and I was a teacher for the best part of the past 30 years.
 The thrust of the Bill is wherever possible to move children into the care system rather than into custody centres. It could be argued that there is not a massive difference between some children in the care system and others in the criminal justice system. That is why we should protect the interests of young people facing custody, to ensure that at least one appropriately legally qualified person will protect their legal interests. As the Bill stands, all those persons and bodies are responsible for the welfare of the child, but no named person takes legal responsibility. In an ideal world, it would be sufficient for those persons and 
 bodies to take responsibility, but just as a child in the care system requires a guardian ad litem, so too, we believe, does the child taken into custody. 
 The United Nations convention on the rights of the child makes the point that children's rights require special protection. It states in the pre-amble that 
''childhood is entitled to special care and assistance.''
 Article 20 states: 
''A child temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her family environment, or in whose own best interests cannot be allowed to remain in that environment, shall be entitled to special protection and assistance provided by the State.''
 Some will argue that such protection could be provided simply by appointing a solicitor. I hope that the Government understand that providing a solicitor who has no special training in the protection of children's interests would be a mistake. It would not be in the best interests of the child. 
 Providing a guardian ad litem in every case of possible custody would be expensive. However, as my hon. Friend the Member for Montgomeryshire said, if the Government do not spend the money up front, they will have to spend it eventually; and with children the money needs to be invested at an early stage. The education and the social care worlds are beginning to understand that principle. If the Bill does not recognise that children need special care at that stage, we will ultimately have failed to protect the rights of the child—and society will pay the price. What I say is based on my experience as a teacher and my rather more limited experience as a chair of social services. 
 There is not much more to be said on the matter. The principle will be either accepted or rejected. We may live to see the day, 30 years on, when what I fear will happen. I would like to think that we could deal with the problem in advance.

Des Browne: In the first instance, I wish to make a slight technical point on amendment No. 224. It will not be the most important point that I shall make in the debate, but I cannot see how an amendment that addresses a matter of process sits well with a general statement on the overall aims of the youth justice system. However, although the amendment seems out of place, it does not detract from the point of principle that the hon. Member for Cheadle seeks to put before the Committee.
 To some degree, the hon. Lady anticipates my response. It is the Government's position that the interests of a child subject to criminal proceedings should be properly represented by a lawyer of that child's choice. That facility will be available to all children subject to those processes under the Bill. In addition, the court will have available a pre-sentence report prepared by the probation officer, which will provide advice to the magistrates on the child's background and suggest the most appropriate outcome. 
 In those circumstances, the guardian ad litem scheme does not have a role. It provides an excellent service to young people in civil proceedings, most often when the interests of the child are not properly represented. The guardian ad litem in civil proceedings 
 is often appointed in cases involving disputes between adults, and the child is not a party to those proceedings. That is why it is necessary to have someone to represent the interests of the child. In criminal proceedings, the child is clearly a party to the proceedings and has proper representation. 
 Amendment No. 252 would permit the guardian ad litem to attend a youth conference, and to act instead of a legal representative as adviser to the child. Although we are keen to ensure that the legal representative attends conferences only in an advisory capacity, his advice will sit within the wider criminal context of the case. We do not believe that a guardian ad litem, whose primary role in all other cases is to advise the court, would necessarily be best placed to provide the child with the advice that they need in those circumstances. 
 Yesterday, I met representatives of the Law Society of Northern Ireland to discuss several matters related to the Bill. I am content that it accepts the responsibility to provide appropriate training to lawyers, so that they can make a constructive contribution to the new processes that we are putting in place. It realises that that is a significant challenge. Our discussion on that and other matters was constructive. I am content that properly trained lawyers will provide the necessary advice and support, in the best interests of the child and of all aspects of the process. 
 When a child is already in contact with a guardian ad litem because of other proceedings, it is likely that the guardian will have a role in sharing information with the conference. It will be open for the guardian to attend the conference under new paragraph 3A(8) of the Criminal Justice (Children) (Northern Ireland) Order 1998, which is proposed in clause 57. 
 We have a responsibility to ensure that the rights of the child are protected during the conference, and we feel that that will be best achieved by allowing the child to be advised by a legal representative. In the light of that, I ask the hon. Member for Cheadle to withdraw her amendment. 
 Amendment No. 259 seeks to ensure that, if a child is eligible for free legal aid, that legal aid covers the appearance of a guardian ad litem when he accompanies the child at a diversionary conference rather than a solicitor. In Northern Ireland, such guardians are paid by the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety. They are not eligible for payment from the legal aid budget, so the amendment is flawed and I ask the hon. Lady not to press it.

Patsy Calton: I am somewhat reassured by some of the Minister's comments, and am prepared to accept that the legal profession will receive specific training to deal with aspects of the problem. Perhaps the Minister would reassure me now that the solicitors or legal representation appointed will be appropriately trained to deal with every case in which there is a possibility that the child will be placed in custody. If the Minister wants to intervene, I will be happy to let him.

Des Browne: I happily accept the hon. Lady's invitation. She will realise that whom a person
 instructs is a matter for that person. It is incumbent on the Government to provide the appropriate support, if necessary, to the bodies that need to train their members. They have undertaken to provide that training, and will train solicitors with the necessary skills. The Government are not in a position to advise any individual child or adult who appears before criminal courts who they should or should not instruct to represent them. That is a matter of individual choice.

Patsy Calton: Individual choice must be paramount, although in some circumstances it may not be in the best interests of the child for the full range of individual choice to be exercised. I accept what the Minister says, but I believe that children will fall through a gap. The system will not necessarily ensure that a child's best interests are represented. I hope that in all cases in which children come into contact with the criminal justice system, specialists who understand their specific needs fully and adequately represent them, but I am concerned that children will fall through the system. However, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Amendment proposed: No. 284, in page 30, line 41, at end insert— 
'(3A) All persons with responsibility for the youth justice system shall have regard to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.'.—[Mr. Mallon.]
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 3, Noes 19.

Question accordingly negatived. 
 Clause 53 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 54 - Reparation orders

Patsy Calton: I beg to move amendment No. 225, in page 31, line 22, after 'otherwise', insert 'directly'.

Derek Conway: With this we may discuss amendment No. 226, in page 31, line 22, at end insert
'by virtue of presence at the scene of the crime or by close familial connection with the victim, i.e. mother, father, brother, sister, child.'.

Patsy Calton: I have had a conversation with the Minister, and these amendments may not be necessary.
 I am not a legal expert, but I sought to limit the number of people who could be considered as victims. My first reading of the Bill suggested that someone who had been traumatised by watching television could claim to be a victim and that the child might have to apologise to them. I understand, however, that there may be a legal definition of the word ''victim'', which the Minister will no doubt share with us.

Des Browne: Amendment No. 225 adds nothing to the provision in the clause. Amendment No. 226 seeks to achieve the hon. Lady's objective.
 There are definitions of victims in other legislation, where other circumstances may or may not apply. Hon. Members who represent the people of Northern Ireland will know that there is a great debate about who should be described as a victim. In another context, the Government's position was to say that they would not prescribe who should be described as a victim and that it was a matter for the person concerned. 
 The hon. Lady may have been misled in private conversations with someone into believing that there was a legal definition of a victim in this case, but there is not. The Government's position on the amendment is that it should be left to the good sense and direction of the court to determine who should benefit from reparations and that we should not seek to provide an exhaustive list. Applying good sense and discretion to the circumstances of any offence should make it clear who the victims are and to whom the provisions should apply.

Patsy Calton: I am somewhat reassured. I have been engaged for many years in looking at matters from a child's perspective. The Minister will appreciate that on reading this part of the Bill from such a perspective, I thought of the matter in terms of hundreds of people who might regard themselves as victims and expect reparation. The Minister assures me that such a situation would not arise, and I am happy with that. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Patsy Calton: I beg to move amendment No. 227, in page 31, line 25, at end insert—
'(aa) a person professionally responsible for the child's education'.

Derek Conway: With this it will be convenient to take the following amendments: No. 228, in page 31, line 32, at end insert—
'(c) details of the child's educational provision.'.
 No. 286, in page 31, line 32, at end insert— 
'(c) the educational, psychological and other needs of the offender'.
 No. 230, in page 32, line 31, leave out 'if any'. 
 No. 231, in page 33, line 22, at end insert— 
'(d) a person professionally responsible for the child's education.'.
 No. 232, in page 33, line 35, after 'case', insert 'including educational information.'. 
 No. 236, in clause 55, page 36, line 5, leave out 'if any'. 
 No. 239, in page 37, line 1, at end insert— 
'(d) the person professionally responsible for the child's education.'.
 No. 251, in clause 57, page 43, line 2, at end insert— 
'(e) a person professionally responsible for the child's education where the child is in receipt of education'.
 No. 255, in page 45, line 19, at end insert— 
'(8) A youth conference plan must contain details of provision for the child's education where the child is in receipt of education'.
 No. 256, in clause 58, page 49, line 6, at end insert— 
'(c) a report on the child's educational progress, including attendance and Key Stage test results where the child is in receipt of education.'.
 No. 257, in clause 60, page 55, line 5, at end insert— 
'(d) a person professionally responsible for the child's education, where the child is in receipt of education.'.

Patsy Calton: Again, these amendments are all of a theme. The education of children, wherever they are, is not just important, but of paramount importance in ensuring that they grow up to be useful members of society. In my previous work as a chair of a local authority social services committee, it became clear, via Government guidelines, that a child's education was to be considered very important and that in many ways that education and its continuance should be considered more important than placing the child in accommodation.
 I have been reading the performance indicators that form part of the quality protects management action plan for Stockport. The Government now regard it as important that a child is kept as close as possible to their home local authority. That applies right across the country. Figures are now provided for how far a child is being taken away from their home local authority. The child is kept close to their home local authority so that they can maintain contact not only with their parents, but as far as possible with their original school. We must examine carefully the crossover in the Bill between the social care system and the youth custody system and ensure that it is seamless, because if we are not careful, children in secure accommodation who have come from the youth justice system will be treated differently from those who, for whatever reason, have ended up in care. 
 Amendments Nos. 227 and 228 are designed to ensure that the education of children is given sufficient prominence in the justice system. I believe that unless it is mentioned at regular intervals in this part of the Bill, its importance will be forgotten and children's education neglected. 
 Amendments Nos. 230 and 236 remove the phrase ''if any''. I recognise that those amendments are unlikely to be accepted, but it is important that there is a presumption that the child will be engaged in education or employment. That ''if any'' provides a loophole for anybody who feels that it is okay for the child not to go to school. 
 I have been engaged with social care and I have visited social care institutions of one sort or another. One of the questions asked by visitors to social care institutions is, ''Where does the child go to school?'' I am not talking about children in secure accommodation, but those who one would expect to be attending school and doing all the things that are expected of children. Too often, the answer is, ''The child does not go to school.'' That is not good enough. 
 There must be a mindset in which children either go to school or receive an education in some other way. I shall be happy not to press for the removal of ''if any'' if the Minister will assure me that the clause will include a presumption that the child will be educated. I am concerned that the words ''if any'' suggest that the child might not be educated.

Crispin Blunt: When I read that, I interpreted ''if any'' as reflecting the situation of 16-year-olds and 17-year-olds who are not necessarily in a place of education or in work. If we take ''if any'' out, it will imply that the reparation order will force them to attend school or another educational establishment or work. That brings many other considerations into play. I shall be grateful for the hon. Lady's comments on that, particularly in light of the fact that the legislation brings 17-year-olds within its ambit.

Patsy Calton: I thank the hon. Gentleman for his intervention. He is right. I understand that the words ''if any'' are there to ensure that the clause covers young people who are no longer in the education system and who are not in employment. However, in my experience, that phrase will provide a loophole for people who believe that it is not that important for a child to be educated. That happens, and we must recognise it. It might happen less often than it used to, but I am concerned.

Andrew Turner: In responding to my hon. Friend the Member for Reigate (Mr. Blunt), the hon. Lady has repeated the assertion that the words provide a loophole. Will she accept that many 16-year-olds and 17-year-olds are not educated? She seems to assume that the world is as she would like it to be.

Patsy Calton: Yes, I agree. The words ''if any'' are probably legally necessary in this case. However, they will give some people the impression that a child's education is not important. Am I seeing the world as I should like it to be? Absolutely. That is how I intend to continue; I have a much better view from where I stand than, perhaps, some others do.

Mark Francois: The hon. Lady has made the point. However, a number of Committee members have tried to explain that the amendment will not achieve what she wants to do. Perhaps it would be easier if we moved on.

Patsy Calton: I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving me further advice. I shall move on. Amendment No. 231 would extend the definition of ''responsible officer'' to a person professionally responsible for the child's education. There might be circumstances in which an educator could be acceptable in that role.
 The intention of amendment No. 232 is much the same as that for amendments Nos. 227 and 228. That is to ensure that the education of children involved in the justice system is given sufficient prominence. Unless that is mentioned at regular intervals throughout this part of the Bill, its importance could be forgotten and the child's education neglected. Educational experience has a vital part to play in the development of a child, and there must be a presumption that a child will receive an education while still of school age. 
 We have covered amendment No. 236. My argument in support of amendment No. 239 is the same as that for amendments Nos. 227, 228, 231 and 232. Amendment No. 251 continues the theme that a child's education is of paramount importance and should be continually supported by the presence of an educator. 
 I will press amendment No. 255 to a separate vote, because it ensures that the child's education is provided for in any plan from a youth conference, and unless it is specifically mentioned, the child's education could be overlooked. 
 Amendments Nos. 256 and 257 are, in a sense, related to amendment No. 255. They would ensure that the child's educational progress was monitored by key stage test results and that the person responsible for the child's education was informed about the youth conference order. 
 We can regard the child's education as being separate from the aims of the Bill, but in my experience, a child's education is fundamental to what we are trying to achieve. If it receives only a passing reference at the beginning of this part of the Bill, it might be forgotten and the care that should be taken to ensure that the child's education is as complete as possible may not be taken. I shall be interested to hear the Minister's response.

Seamus Mallon: I wish to speak to amendment No. 286, which requires that the report provided for in article 36A should indicate
''the educational, psychological and other needs of the offender.''
 The amendment is relevant to my previous point about need. This is a perfect example of how welfare might be fulfilled but need overlooked. I believe that paragraph (5) of article 36A is flawed because, although it specifies that the report must indicate 
''the type of requirements that it would be appropriate to impose on the offender''
 that is, the sentence, and 
''the attitude of the victim or victims''
 that is, it recognises the rights and role of victims, it leaves out the third part of the equation: the offender. In these cases, the offenders will be children, so we must complete the circle. I have great respect for the probation service and for people involved in social work, but they may not always be able to make the type of assessment that is required, because the offender may have other needs that require more expert involvement. In many cases, the experienced social worker or probation officer will be able to identify educational and, perhaps, psychological needs, but in certain circumstances the assessment may have to go further than that, and the amendment would make the necessary provision. Although the onus of responsibility will, in most instances, be carried by the probation service and social workers, there may be circumstances that require the assessment of other needs that are not provided for in the Bill.

Derek Conway: Order. Before any other hon. Members speak, I should inform the hon. Member for Cheadle, as she has been helpful enough to tell us that she wants a Division on amendment No. 255, that we shall take that Division when we debate clause 57. Because of the way in which the timetabling motion works, I may put all the votes at one o'clock.

Crispin Blunt: My general approach to the amendments is that they are well intentioned. Naturally, as there is a requirement on all those involved that the best interests of the child offender are protected, children should continue to receive education if they are already receiving it. However, with respect to reparation orders as they are described in the Bill—an amendment that I have tabled would change that—the maximum reparation is for 24 hours. The orders are already limited, therefore.
 The amendments would place an additional bureaucratic burden on the order process, especially amendment No. 286 tabled by the hon. Member for Newry and Armagh, which requires the production of yet another report. The clause represents a new departure. When we draft such legislation we should try to be prescriptive as little as possible to ensure that the system gets up and running and is not destroyed under a huge weight of bureaucracy.

Seamus Mallon: In case there is any misunderstanding, amendment No. 286 does not propose a report, but adds to the requirements for the one report that is prescribed in new article 36A(5).

Crispin Blunt: I understand that, but we should consider how the legislation would be used by the practitioners. The requirements prescribed in proposed new subsection (5) are general. The Bill states:
''The report must indicate—
(a) the type of requirements that it would be appropriate to impose on the offender; and
(b) the attitude of the victim or victims of the offence to the requirements proposed to be included in the order.''
 If the hon. Gentleman's amendment were included in the Bill, the practitioners would be faced with a checklist of 
''the educational, psychological and other needs of the offender''.
 Those ''other needs'' might produce another lengthy checklist. For example, the hon. Member for Cheadle would like to include educational requirements on a checklist. 
 The instrument of the reparation order will emerge only after the individual has been through a youth conference process, and that individual will have to consent under the order, as he has to consent under the whole youth conference process. The amendments may be well intentioned, but they would strangle the effectiveness of the system that we are putting in place. 
 Reparation orders will represent a less formal part of the youth justice process in an effort to persuade the offender to face up to his responsibilities to the victim. To achieve that aim, there must be flexibility in the structure. Although the amendments are fine in their intention, when translated into practice they could have the unintended effect of making the system more difficult to administer. At this stage, we can only guess 
 at the bureaucratic burden that will come from the new departure in youth justice that is being planned. 
 We must be concerned about the possibility that an enormous burden will fall on those trying to administer the process, particularly in the initial stages. Reparation orders involve a series of additional responsibilities and cannot come into effect until the Secretary of State has made certain other provisions. Our instinctive, underlying approach should be to keep matters as simple as possible. I therefore hope that the hon. Member for Newry and Armagh will not press the amendment. The Committee has heard what he and the hon. Member for Cheadle have said, but while the issues to be tackled are important, we should try not to burden those who will administer the system in a way that could lead to unbalanced outcomes, particularly with respect to reparations.

Des Browne: The hon. Member for Reigate makes important points about reparation orders, and about the community responsibility orders to be dealt with under clause 55. However, the response from the hon. Member for Cheadle could include the point that some of her amendments go further, and would entail conferencing orders, which could apply to offences of greater seriousness than those for which reparation orders would be appropriate.
 This extensive group of amendments—with the exception of amendment No. 286, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Newry and Armagh—effectively deals not with several issues but with just one issue in several different ways. Following the order, or at least the approach, taken by the hon. Member for Cheadle, I shall attempt to deal with the amendments as briefly as possible. I shall try to take them in the order in which they appear on the selection sheet. 
 On amendment No. 227, the education of a young person is important, and care must be taken to avoid conflict between that and the requirements of a reparation order. However, it is not necessary or appropriate to require that a person professionally responsible for the child's education should report to the court on the appropriateness of the reparation and the attitude of the victim, which would be the amendment's effect. Generally, teachers have no obvious qualifications to make such judgments, particularly in relation to a victim. I can see how teachers would have a contribution to make with respect to a child who could be in their care for part of the day, and for whose education they were partly responsible, but I do not see that they would have skills to contribute to a report on the appropriateness of the reparation and the victim's attitude. Under the Bill the Secretary of State would already have powers to designate a person to perform the relevant function, in circumstances where that would make sense. 
 Amendment No. 251 would similarly require an education professional to attend every youth conference. I wonder if teachers would really welcome that duty in addition to all those that they now have. I urge the hon. Lady not to press the amendment to a vote. I do not know if it is her intention that a teacher should be required to attend 
 every youth conference, or merely to make it possible for teachers to attend, but the effect of the amendment would be to require it. 
 On amendment No. 228, I accept that details of the child's educational provision are important and should be reflected in the court report to avoid unnecessary interference between those arrangements and the reparation requirements. However, other aspects of the child's life, such as religion or work, should also be taken into account in determining the appropriateness of the requirements of a reparation order. We do not want to be drawn into ranking them in importance. We should include all or none of them. As I explained when I was urged to include some of the considerations, the appropriate list will be inferred from the provision, and the application of common sense by the courts and others will identify what aspects of a child's life we should report on. We should not try to be prescriptive. 
 I fully accept that the factors set out in amendment No. 286 are typical of those that must be taken into account when determining the requirements of a reparation order. I would, however, expect those factors and others, such as the child's age, to inform the court's decision about what requirements are appropriate in each case. I am, therefore, content to leave it to the courts and to those professionals who prepare the reports to reach sensible judgments on such matters. The courts would have to take such factors into account when deciding what was appropriate, and I refer my hon. Friend the Member for Newry and Armagh to new article 36A(5)(a). They are also bound to have regard to the child's welfare under clause 53(3). 
 On amendment No. 230, there will be circumstances in which a child who is subject to a reparation order may be beyond compulsory school age, not in full-time education and unemployed, and similar considerations apply to amendment No. 236. For all the reasons that have been given, I would ask the hon. Member for Cheadle not to press those amendments. 
 Amendment No. 231 would add to the categories of people who can be nominated as responsible officers. That extremely unusual power would be unwelcome with most teachers and educational professionals. Placing someone with responsibility for a child's education in a position of having to enforce a court order could have a detrimental effect on the child's attitude to education if, for example, breach proceedings were necessary. 
 The provisions at which amendment No. 232 is aimed transfer the authority for a reparation order from the court that imposed it to the court in the petty sessions district in which the child lives, if that is different. That technical provision will enable the court that acts for the receiving area to deal with matters such as breach, revocation and amendment. In any event, a court that had such information or any other relevant information would forward it to the other court as a matter of course. Therefore, there is no particular point to the amendment. 
 On amendment No. 239, copies of a community responsibility order must be given immediately to the child who is subject to the order, to his parent or guardian and to the officer responsible for supervising the order. That is for the information of all concerned and the proper discharge of the order. Although it will be important to ensure, as far as is practicable, that the order does not interfere with, among other things, the child's education—contact between the responsible officer and, say, a teacher may be necessary for that purpose—I see no reason why the person who is professionally responsible for the child's education must also receive a copy of the order. In any event, I cannot think what purpose they would put it to. 
 Amendment No. 255 requires the conference plan, in all cases that involve children who are still in receipt of education, to contain details of provisions for the child's education. The conference already has the power to include educational elements in the plan, and the child can be required to participate in 
''activities . . . offering education or training''.
 It does not, however, follow that, just because a child is in education, all offending behaviour must be tackled through the provision of education. Nor does it follow that the plan will cut across the child's education; in fact, the reverse will be true, because the co-ordinator will ensure that the plan's requirements do not interfere with the child's schooling. 
 Amendment No. 256 would require that, when the director is informed of the extent to which the child has complied with the youth conference plan, he also receives a report on the child's attendance and performance at school in every case that involves a child who is still in receipt of education. New article 10D provides that a report must go to the director at the end of the period that is specified in the youth conference plan to inform him of the extent to which the child has complied with the plan. That information will enable him to decide whether to instigate proceedings in respect of the child. Education may not be a relevant consideration here, and it is inappropriate to insist that it would be in every case. 
 Amendment No. 257 would require a copy of the youth conference order to be given to a professional responsible for the child's education in all cases where the child is still in receipt of education. It will be necessary for the child's school to know when the plan includes requirements relating to the child's attendance or performance at school, to ensure that compliance is monitored. If the plan includes no such requirements, I do not agree that the school should, as a matter of course, be informed about that order. For all those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Cheadle not to press the amendment. I make a similar request of my hon. Friend the Member for Newry and Armagh.

Tony McWalter: Will the Minister enlighten me? I am confused about the references to schedule 1A in the clause. I had expected to find the details of schedule 1A on page 119, where amendments to the Criminal Justice (Children) (Northern Ireland) Order 1998 are
 detailed, but it is not there. The schedule relates to the precise way in which the orders work. I would not wish the Committee to move on from consideration of the clause without having debated whether schedule 1A is to be implemented by statutory instrument.

Des Browne: I am grateful to my hon. Friend. If any other hon. Members are looking for schedule 1A, they will find it in schedule 10.

Seamus Mallon: I have listened with interest to the Minister. I am still unhappy that the report, which, for the young person, would be very important, is incomplete. It is so in the sense that there is no reference to the needs, be they educational, psychological or of some other kind, of the young person. That incompleteness would have been remedied had the previous reference to ''needs'' been successfully adopted and included in the Bill.
 Again, the absence of any reference to the young person reflects the Bill's miserly approach to the needs of the young person. I take the Minister's point on new clause 3. I also take the point about probation officers and social workers. However, I still believe that there are cases where it would be right to ensure that other needs that often prevail in this type of case are provided for, in terms beyond those specified in the Bill. 
 I know the probation and social services and I respect them, so I shall not press the amendment. I shall, in an act of faith, accept that the element of the new clause to which the Minister referred is adequate. I hope that, for once in my life, an act of faith will prove well-founded.

Patsy Calton: I am somewhat disappointed that the hon. Member for Newry and Armagh will not press amendment No. 286 to a vote. In my view, it is better than amendment No. 228. It covers more ground and so should be included in the Bill. However, if the hon. Gentleman is prepared to accept that the new clause to which the Minister referred will cover the provisions that he seeks to add, I shall indulge in a similar act of faith.
 The Minister said that education would be regarded as important and taken into account. In the light of that, I am prepared to withdraw amendment No. 227 and not press any others, apart from amendment No. 255, which ensures that the child's education will be provided for in any plan from a youth conference. It may need tidying up so that it fits all the legal niceties, but a youth plan should recognise the importance of education as it is usually regarded by most of us in this country.

Lady Hermon: I welcome you back to the Chair, Mr. Conway. I am delighted to see you.
 I want to explain to the hon. Members for Newry and Armagh and for Cheadle that, under the Human Rights Act 1998, every child in the jurisdiction of Northern Ireland already has the right to an education, in accordance with their parents' religious beliefs or philosophical convictions. That right will extend to the children who will be subject to the orders.

Patsy Calton: I thank the hon. Lady for her intervention and assistance. I am more than willing to accept that there may already be legal provision for every child in Northern Ireland. However, my experience has shown over many years that even legal provision on the subject does not always work. As people who are putting legislation together now, we should remind those who will come after us that we regard education as of paramount importance in a child's life.

Mark Francois: I appreciate the point that the hon. Lady is trying to make. Is her argument that legislative provision has not necessarily achieved its aim? If so, what is the point of making further legislative provision?

Patsy Calton: Therein lies the difference between a Conservative and a Liberal Democrat. Conservatives tend to be less optimistic on the whole than Liberal Democrats. I have been a teacher and a chair of social services, and I know what the Government guidelines are for children in care. I know what the Government say about children in care in other places. Many of the relevant children will effectively be in care, and they will be treated slightly differently from those who are not. Their education should be important.
 I have said all that already, and there is little point in saying more. Amendment No. 255 should be voted on, but I shall not press any others in the group. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Derek Conway: I remind the Committee that in the next hour, we need to dispose of, by whatever means, 11 clauses and schedules. That may help hon. Members with the length of their speeches.

Patsy Calton: I beg to move amendment No. 229, in page 31, line 35, after 'consents', insert
', having been previously informed of the potential outcomes of consent.'.
 I shall do my best to keep my speech short. The amendment introduces the concept of informed consent appropriate to the child's age.

Crispin Blunt: On a point of order, Mr. Conway. I apologise to the hon. Lady for interrupting her, but I have been reflecting on your remarks and seek your guidance. It is plain that we do not have enough time to consider the rest of part 4. Your injunction to make our speeches short should be permanent, in the sense that hon. Members should keep to the point in debate. However, we will not be able to give part 4 proper consideration. Do we then ignore amendments that are important and issues that need to be discussed, or foreshorten our debates? The Government have got us into this mess, so why should there be a duty on us not to give proper consideration to the issues?

Derek Conway: I hear what the hon. Gentleman says. My injunction was not for brevity. As long as hon. Members stay in order, I shall allow them to speak, but I wanted to ensure that the Committee was aware of the small writing at the end of the first column on the selection list, which points out that debates up to those on new clauses and new schedules
 relating to part 4 must be concluded under the programming motion by one o'clock. It is not in my gift to change the programming motion; that is for those who decide such matters and for the instructions of the House.
 As long as hon. Members stay in order, they can speak for as long as they want, but the length of their speeches will affect whether they reach all the matters that they want to reach.

Patsy Calton: I had virtually said all that I was going to say. We should consider the important concept of informed consent appropriate to the child's age. I again draw the Committee's attention to the need for appropriate legal advice. In many submissions made to the review, concern was expressed that children should understand what they were agreeing to when they were asked to consent to various procedures. That is what the amendment seeks to ensure.

Des Browne: The hon. Lady is right to point out that a reparation order cannot be made unless the child consents. She seeks to qualify that requirement. By definition, consent can be sought only when the requirements of the order are determined. Given that the child will previously have been informed of the possible outcomes of consent, I see no need for the amendment.
 The hon. Lady may seek to avoid circumstances in which a child might agree to something while being unaware of the consequences of the order in terms of, for example, criminal record. If so, I should say that we expect that the child will have the advice of a legal representative to ensure that he or she knows the exact consequences. In part, I return to an answer that I gave to the hon. Lady some time previously. There is a significant choice in terms of representation and advice. A child has a right to that, as does an adult, and the Government cannot interfere with it.

Patsy Calton: I thank the Minister for that answer. The same arguments apply as applied to the guardian ad litem. We must be certain that the child will receive appropriate advice, as would come from properly trained people. The Minister has given assurances about that, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Crispin Blunt: I beg to move amendment No. 262, in page 31, leave out line 38.
 I was surprised to read in new article 36B(2) that 
''The court must not make a reparation order in respect of the offender if it proposes—
(a) to pass on him a custodial sentence; or
(b) to make in respect of him a community service order, a community responsibility order or a combination order.''
 The amendment would strike out the restriction on passing a custodial sentence. One can see that there is a degree of overlap between community service orders and reparation orders, but the principle surely applies across the piece. The amendment also serves as a vehicle for a debate on reparation orders as described in the Bill. 
 Paragraph 10.75 of the review recommends the introduction of reparation orders in Northern Ireland, after which it states: 
''We believe that the introduction of reparation orders and the new form of community service for those under 16 years of age will provide useful additions to youth conference co-ordinators and sentencers in creating imaginative, appropriate and proportionate youth conference plans.''
 Reparation orders should not be a stand-alone punishment that cannot be taken in conjunction with other forms of punishment that might be awarded by the courts. 
 The principle behind the orders is that the offender consents to both the youth conference and reparation orders. If we want to create as flexible a system as possible, we should allow a youth conference to conclude that a variety of different types of order may be appropriate. I do not understand why an element of reparation should not sit alongside a custodial sentence. If the offender agrees to the order, as is required, it may be appropriate to have a combination for a serious offence, such as mobile phone theft, for which the Lord Chief Justice has said there should be exemplary penalties. If negotiation with the offender, which must happen if his consent is to be achieved, enabled him to make reparation in combination with a sentence, and if his reparation were thought to be genuine and were carried out under the system proposed in the Bill, a shorter sentence might be passed because the youth conference could be confident that a reparation order had been made and had linked the offender and the victim. 
 Reparation orders are a positive vehicle, as they provide the opportunity for direct reparation between victim and offender, and the new article limits them unnecessarily. I hope that the Government will reconsider the matter and ensure that reparation orders can be used in a more flexible framework. That could mean their not only accepting amendment No. 262 but returning on Report to remove new article 36B(2) altogether. If the Government do not agree to the amendment, I may seek to remove the paragraph myself on Report to allow reparation orders to be used as flexibly as possible in order to give them maximum effect.

Des Browne: In raising an issue that it is appropriate to raise at this point in the Bill, the hon. Member for Reigate gives me an opportunity to clarify some basic points about reparation orders.
 Significant thought was given to the subject of his amendment, which is the combination of custody and reparation. To understand our decision, one must understand the consistent approach taken in relation to custody for young offenders. We intend reparation orders to be available for children whose offence is relatively minor, or for first-time offenders. Custody, on the other hand, is traditionally and appropriately a last resort for serious offenders, so the two things cannot be combined as the hon. Gentleman suggests. If custody is appropriate, we are dealing with a far more serious offence than the ones to which it is expected or intended that reparation orders will apply. 
 The restriction in relation to custody orders is therefore necessary, in our view. 
 The hon. Gentleman asks why a reparation order cannot be combined with the orders mentioned in new article 36B(2)(b), but those orders incorporate an element of reparation or work in the community, so it would seem inappropriate and, arguably, disproportionate, to add a reparation order on top of them. The element of reparation can be incorporated into the orders when appropriate, so there is no need to create double reparation by adding another distinct provision on top.

Crispin Blunt: I am grateful to the Minister for his reply, but I want to clarify one point about community service orders. Am I correct in saying that orders to make reparation to the victim can be part of
''a community service order, a community responsibility order or a combination order''?
 While he considers that point, I must say that I do not find his arguments about the inappropriateness of combining reparation orders with serious offences that require custodial sentences wholly convincing. A first-time offender may be guilty of an offence such as street robbery, as is perfectly possible in an age of rising street robbery and when the Lord Chief Justice is giving instructions in favour of exemplary sentences for mobile phone theft. Given its serious nature, such a first offence may require a custodial sentence, but we may want to have the flexibility to bring the offender face to face with his victim in the way envisaged under reparation orders. Such a restriction on reparation orders in relation to custodial sentences creates an unnecessary limitation.

Des Browne: Without going into debates that we may have under other parts of the Bill, I suggest to the hon. Gentleman that he should consider the whole suite of provisions, including community responsibility orders, community service orders and youth conferencing. To concentrate all the reparative aspects of justice on one order is to fail to understand how the orders interact and where they can substitute for one another. We do not intend that each person who appears before the court can be made subject to every order.
 In respect of community service orders, the element of reparation may be not to the victim but to the community. Of course, the reparative aspect of a community service order and other orders can be recognised.

Crispin Blunt: That makes my point precisely, because the role of victims in reparative justice is important. It would be healthy for reparation to be seen to be made directly to victims, although the Bill would plainly have to require the offender to consent to reparation being made in that way. Such an approach would, however, tackle victims' concerns that reparation should be made to them and deal with the offender.
 It misses the point simply to say that a community service order makes reparation to the whole community. As we shall debate later, victims are part of the youth conference system, but if offenders are 
 sent to prison because of the seriousness of their offence, it will become impossible for victims to receive direct reparation through a reparation order—even when everyone agrees that direct reparation is the desired outcome. That is an unnecessary restriction. 
 It is important that victims see reparations made directly to them, rather than indirectly to the community. I suspect that most victims do not have confidence that community service orders always result in indirect reparation to them. The amendment would go to the heart of the issue by giving victims a proper role in the process, which is clearly what is desired—at a philosophical level, at least—in the Bill. I shall therefore press the amendment to a vote. 
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 3, Noes 17.

Question accordingly negatived.

Crispin Blunt: I beg to move amendment No. 32, in page 32, line 24, leave out '24' and insert '160'.
 When I first read that a reparation order could not require the offender to make reparation for more than 24 hours, I wondered whether there was a typo, because 24 hours does not sound like a great deal of time. I know from discussions on the Bill that reparation orders are—in the minds of the draftsmen, as I am sure the Minister will explain—at the bottom of the list of punishments available to the courts. None the less, the clause would wholly limit their effectiveness. 
 We should bear it in mind that the Bill brings within its ambit 17-year-olds who can be sentenced to 240 hours' community service. I see a parallel between reparation orders that benefit the victim and those that help the community. Whether reparation is made to the community or directly to the victim should be a matter of judgment.

Lady Hermon: May I draw to the hon. Gentleman's attention the equivalent number of hours that would be regarded as appropriate in England and Wales? Section 74(1)(a) of the Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 states that
''A reparation order shall not require the offender to work for more than 24 hours in aggregate''.
 Can he explain why young people in Northern Ireland should be subject to a reparation order that would increase those hours to 160?

Crispin Blunt: First, because the legislation will bring 17-year-olds within its ambit. I believe that the victim should stand at the centre of reparative justice and that
 it should be a matter of judgment as to whether reparation is made to the victim or to the community. If it is appropriate to make community service orders—benefiting the community—of 240 hours, it is unnecessarily limiting to say that only 10 per cent. of the reparation should be given in instances in which the victim might gain from it.

Lembit Öpik: What does the hon. Gentleman regard as the primary objective of the reparation order, and does he think that there is any element of rehabilitation involved in it?

Crispin Blunt: Yes, I do. That is why I do not think that it should be limited to 24 hours, particularly for 16 and 17-year-olds who are no longer in full-time education. I would envisage that serving a lengthy period of reparation would achieve a relationship between offender and victim. That could be set up only if both agreed. If it were possible for that relationship to be established over a period, it would be a direct way in which the offender could begin to be reintegrated into society. It would not be a punishment being administered by representatives of the state—of course, it would be overseen by them—but would be a direct way of allowing the offender to create a relationship with the victim. Presumably, that is the intention of reparation orders, even those limited to 24 hours' work.
 I can see that 240 hours is equivalent to a community service order, and that the amendment says 160 hours. The right duration is a matter of judgment—the court should be able to judge, in the light of the nature of the victim and of the offender, which sort of order would be appropriate and what the duration should be. My preference is for reparation to be made directly to the victim rather than to the community, so 24 hours is too limiting, especially as we are considering offenders up to the age of 18.

Lembit Öpik: There is an interesting debate to be had about the question of reparation and rehabilitation. Does the hon. Gentleman accept that, even if his argument were to hold water, the amendment would create a different set of circumstances for those who are under 17, as the hon. Member for North Down (Lady Hermon) has pointed out? We would need a more sophisticated amendment if we were to maintain parity with the rest of the United Kingdom.

Crispin Blunt: I am happy to accept the hon. Gentleman's point: we would, if we were going to be as sophisticated as the review intended. At paragraph 10.74, the review states:
''We recommend that a form of community service should be developed for those under 16 years of age, with a maximum period of service of 40 hours.''
 Again, that would be different from what happens in the rest of the United Kingdom. 
 The Bill will bring about differences, not only with reparation orders but in other areas, because it introduces an experimental system of criminal justice for youth. Northern Ireland's experience in the wake of these proposals will clearly hold important lessons for the rest of the UK. It would be a pity to limit reparation orders to 24 hours because of the 
 relationship between offender and victim, which is intended to aid rehabilitation, especially as they will involve 16 and 17-year-olds. 
 I hope that the Government will be flexible in considering the amendment. I shall not press it to a Division. Deciding what the number should be is a matter of judgment. Perhaps the amendment should be more sophisticated, as the hon. Member for Montgomeryshire suggests. I should be grateful if the Government would keep an open mind.

Mark Francois: Mindful of your earlier remarks, Mr. Conway, I shall be brief. The amendment seeks merely to give courts greater flexibility in deciding for how long reparation orders should be in force. It would not dictate that a court should impose 160 hours. It would give the courts greater flexibility in exercising their judgment and allow them to impose a slightly longer order if it was thought that it might help with rehabilitation. It is a facilitating amendment, and I ask the Government to consider it from that point of view.

Des Browne: The clause provides the courts with a new community-based disposal. As the hon. Member for North Down helpfully pointed out, it broadly replicates the provisions that apply in England and Wales. The hon. Member for Reigate said that we are seeking to do a number of things differently from England and Wales. He is right, but when we seek to enact provisions broadly similar to those that apply in England and Wales, it behoves us to be consistent about the penalties that apply there and in Northern Ireland. Those penalties must also be proportionate.

Crispin Blunt: When the Minister speaks of penalties being imposed, are those penalties that are consented to?

Des Browne: Yes, but they are still imposed. One may consent to the imposition of them, but they are still imposed by the courts. That does not differentiate the penalties as between Northern Ireland and England and Wales, nor does it detract from the argument put by the hon. Member for North Down—which, with respect, the hon. Member for Reigate did not properly answer.
 The hon. Gentleman's reference to the extension of reparation orders to 17-year-olds does not answer the point for the following reason: it is the Government's intention that reparation orders will be a low-level disposal and, as the hon. Member for Rayleigh (Mr. Francois) rightly pointed out, it is particularly suited to younger offenders and to those who have not progressed to more serious offences. That is why they are restricted to 24 hours, and the courts will use them only in that respect. One should not underestimate the impact of 24 hour's intervention in a young person's life in such circumstances. I would also argue that the reparative nature of the order might be lost if its duration was seen as punitive in relation to the offences for which it was likely to be used. That is the important argument about proportionality. 
 The orders have their genesis in English legislation. Home Office research published in 2001, which 
 evaluated the effectiveness of youth offending teams under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, reflects the broadly positive experience of the same order in England and Wales. For example, more than 80 per cent. of the orders were found to be completely satisfactory. That is a high level of satisfaction with the court orders imposed. 
 As the hon. Member for Reigate said, for more serious offences or offenders, other community orders, for example a probation order, or a community service order for those aged over 16, are available. These orders are not intended to be substitutes for others; they should be seen as part of a progression of orders that are being enacted in relation to the Bill. This order is intended to apply at the lowest level to first offenders and very young offenders.

Crispin Blunt: I have listened to the Minister and I am disappointed that the Government's position is not more flexible. I want to take up one point about whether the orders will provide proportionate reparation. The maximum order that can be imposed is 24 hours, and 24 hours at the minimum wage amounts to about £100 worth of labour. Only in the minority of cases will the victim have suffered £100 worth of harm and will such an order bring the offender to justice. Any amount of vandalism or theft is extremely likely to involve loss equivalent to more than £100.

Des Browne: I would not like the Committee to suppose that this way of thinking, which reduces everything to pounds and pence, is the Government's way of thinking. It may be the Opposition's thinking that the effectiveness of orders and disposals by the court should be reflected in monetary terms.

Crispin Blunt: No, the Opposition are thinking about the victims, who will be told that the maximum reparation that they can receive towards the hurt that they have endured is an order worth 24 hours of work by a young person. The victim may think that that is insulting given the hurt and damage that he or she may have suffered. By setting such a restriction on the number of hours, part of the clause's purpose—enabling the victim to feel that he or she is part of the process and can gain proper reparation—would be lost.

Andrew Turner: Does my hon. Friend accept that when an adult commits a crime, there are other means by which he or she can be required to pay compensation, but when a young person commits a crime, it is unlikely that they will have any assets on which to draw to pay compensation to the victim? In such circumstances, it is not at all unfair to reduce the matter to pounds, shillings and pence.

Crispin Blunt: I agree with my hon. Friend, who puts the point well.
 I do not want to detain the Committee further on this point. I regret that there is no flexibility in the Government's thinking. We shall consider how best to draft amendments that will meet our concerns about the age-related nature of the issue and ensure consistency throughout the system, and we shall 
 return to the subject on Report with the victim firmly in mind. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment. 
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lady Hermon: I beg to move amendment No. 265, in page 33, leave out line 22.

Derek Conway: With this we may also consider amendment No. 266, in clause 55, page 34, leave out line 29.

Lady Hermon: If Committee members turn to paragraph (4) of article 36A, they will see that,
''Before making a reparation order, the court must obtain''—
 it has a duty to obtain— 
''and consider a written report by—
(a) a probation officer;
(b) a social worker of the appropriate authority; or
(c) such other person as the Secretary of State may designate.''
 That gives the Secretary of State wide discretion. I have no idea who might be in that grouping. 
 Likewise, the new article 36D(2) that the clause would insert into the Criminal Justice (Children) (Northern Ireland) Order 1998, states: 
''In this Order 'responsible officer', in relation to an offender subject to a reparation order, means one of the following who is specified in the order—
''(a) a probation officer;
(b) a social worker of the appropriate authority''
 and, again, the open-ended category of 
''(c) such other person as the Secretary of State may designate.''
 Amendments Nos. 265 and 266 would remove the references to that category. However, I have in mind the comment last week by the hon. Member for East Londonderry (Mr. Campbell) that he represented 
''a community that has often been overlooked in appointments to non-departmental public bodies''
 and his assertion that his 
''community sees itself as unrepresented on a variety of bodies,''—[Official Report, Standing Committee F, 7 February 2002; c. 274.]
 I hesitate about damaging his community's chance of being represented. Perhaps it would be possible to enlighten me as to who is envisaged as being affected by the provision, so that I can review my amendments. 
 My fallback measure is to compare what is proposed for Northern Ireland with what has been arranged for the rest of the United Kingdom, which means I must return to the subject of the Powers of Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000. Under section 74(5) of that Act, in England and Wales a responsible officer is defined in limited terms, as 
''(a) a probation officer;
(b) a social worker of a local authority social services department'',
 or 
(c) a member of a youth offending team.''
 That is an exhaustive list. We know where it begins and ends, but it is proposed that in Northern Ireland the Secretary of State should be able to designate anyone. That is too open ended. Will the Minister explain the phrasing that has been used and tell the 
 Committee whom the Government had in mind for the function in question when the Bill was being drafted?

Des Browne: The flexibility for the Secretary of State to designate anyone as a responsible officer is necessary to ensure that schemes for reparation orders and community responsibility orders will be available in all parts of Northern Ireland, because it allows for those with a direct interest in the statutory sector, such as the juvenile justice board, and the voluntary sector, which already works closely and effectively with children who offend, to act as responsible officers and to be responsible for the supervision of the child where appropriate. Those would be the very people to be appointed to youth offending teams in Northern Ireland, if such things existed there, but since they do not, the Secretary of State requires flexibility. It is intended that only people who would have been members of youth offending teams will be appointed.

Lady Hermon: Will the Minister undertake to tighten up the provision? He has explained whom the designation was intended to include, and perhaps a form of words could be arrived at to be included in the Bill later in its progress. Clarifying the Bill seems preferable to retaining the reference to
''such other person as the Secretary of State may designate.''

Derek Conway: Order. The hon. Lady was inviting the Minister to intervene, and he did not. Therefore she should advise me whether she will seek leave to withdraw the amendment, the debate having concluded, or whether she wants to press it to a division.

Lady Hermon: In light of the time and of the Minister's generous nature, for which he is famous and in which I shall place my confidence, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 54 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 55 - Community responsibility orders

Des Browne: I beg to move amendment No. 210, in page 34, line 7, leave out
'punishable, in the case of an adult, with imprisonment'.
 The clause provides the courts with a new community-based disposal, as recommended by the criminal justice review. The order combines appropriate reparative activity with instruction in citizenship and is, therefore, particularly suitable for younger offenders, who need better to understand the context within which they make reparation. 
 By making the order subject to a less strenuous test and, therefore, available for a wider range of offences, the amendment ensures that it can be used at the most appropriate time for those who might benefit most from it. The amendment responds to comments that were made during the consultation period.

Crispin Blunt: I have no difficulty with the Minister asking for more flexibility as regards the imposition of these orders, but I am surprised that he should do so following a debate in which he rejected an opportunity to introduce more flexibility into the youth justice
 system. There is a slight philosophical inconsistency in the Government's approach; indeed, the only consistent element is perhaps the ''not invented here'' syndrome that is evident in their ideas. It might be better if they approached the Committee's proceedings with a mind that was more open to accepting ideas.
 We are happy to accept that the philosophy that underlies the youth justice system should make it as flexible and usable as possible so that we can embark on this new departure in youth justice in the most satisfactory manner and apply the lessons to the rest of the United Kingdom. We are happy to support the amendment. 
 Amendment agreed to.

Lembit Öpik: I beg to move amendment No. 233, in page 34, line 16, leave out 'instruction', and insert 'teaching'.

Derek Conway: With this we may discuss amendment No. 234, in page 34, line 18, leave out 'instruction' and insert 'teaching'.

Lembit Öpik: The amendments are so sensible that they should really be Government amendments, and I expect the Committee to treat them as such.

Crispin Blunt: Will the hon. Gentleman reflect on those remarks for a second?

Lembit Öpik: Yes, indeed I shall. If these were Government amendments, it would mean that the Liberal Democrats were already in power, which, I am sure, is what the hon. Gentleman had in mind.
 The amendments would change the wording of the clause, because the word ''instruction'' is a rather dramatic description of how one would teach citizenship, and the word ''teaching'' is more in line with the spirit of what is intended. Instruction implies forcing concepts down people's throats, and I was about to say that it was an aggressive activity; indeed, it might be something that old Labour Members would enjoy. As a liberal-minded kind of person, however, I think that teaching best describes the two-way approach that is most suited to learning about citizenship. I shall be interested to hear the Minister accept the amendments.

Crispin Blunt: What an extraordinary admission of the Liberal Democrats' state of mind that they should think that the only sensible amendments are Government amendments. I realise that they have been the Government's auxiliaries since 1997, but a position of such astonishing supplication quite takes my breath away.

Lembit Öpik: I am a continuing supporter of a bipartisan agreement that applies to the Liberal Democrats and the Labour party alone. It is, therefore, obvious why, in the spirit of positivity, I would be willing to lend the Government such a good amendment.

Crispin Blunt: If the hon. Member for Montgomeryshire is going to make such remarks, he might like to reflect on where he is sitting and whether he is in the appropriate part of the Room.

Chris Mole: I thought that the hon. Gentleman was complaining just now that there was not enough time.

Crispin Blunt: The hon. Gentleman is deluding himself if he thinks that we will be able consider the rest of this part of the Committee's consideration in 16 minutes. Everything that the Opposition have said about the conduct of the Committee's business has turned out to be correct. I might add that the Liberal Democrats voted with the Government on where to put the knives.
 The implication of the hon. Gentleman's remarks—that we should now track through the rest of the consideration in 15 minutes—is wholly misguided. The Committee has already failed to consider three quarters of the first part of the Bill. Other clauses have also not been considered. I am blowed if we will be able to ensure that the Bill is passed on to Report stage having been properly considered. The Committee's consideration of the Bill has been wholly appropriate throughout; indeed, the Minister has been complaining that the hon. Member for East Londonderry has not made a proper contribution to the Committee. If he had, that would have lengthened debate even more. 
 I can see you rising, Mr. Conway, so I shall return to the Bill. It is appropriate to put those matters on the record. The difference between ''instruction'' and ''teaching'' escapes me. This is more Liberal Democrat aspirational nonsense that does not need to be included in the Bill.

Des Browne: I am always interested in discussing the nuances of words, as we have done in the past, but I cannot for the life of me see any substantive difference between the two words. There is a difference of emphasis, however, to which I will come in a moment. I do not want to suggest that teaching is not instructive, but I prefer the word ''instruction'' in this context, because it implies the provision of guidance and direction, which is exactly what the children in question need.

Lembit Öpik: The hon. Member for Reigate is not being very nice to me, but he is, after all, a Conservative. Nevertheless, we have made our point. If the Minister, who will monitor the implementation of the measures, will ensure that meaningful citizenship education is provided, then that ought to satisfy me, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Crispin Blunt: I beg to move amendment No. 309, in page 34, line 34, leave out '40' and insert '240'.
 I am sorry that the hon. Member for Montgomeryshire thinks that I am not being very nice to him. I would point out that it is his knife that is now sticking in the guts of the Committee's consideration, since he voted for the programme motion when it was first considered. However, I shall move on to ground on which I may be able to convince the hon. Gentleman. 
 Amendment No. 309 is designed to increase the maximum aggregate number of hours that can be 
 specified in a community responsibility order from 40 to 240. The purpose of the measure is to bring 17-year-olds into the remit of the measure and achieve some degree of consistency. It is not envisaged that much younger offenders to whom the measure would apply would be subject to a maximum of 240 hours—that is not the intention behind the amendment. We discussed this matter at an earlier stage. I seek an indication from the Government that 40 hours may not be an appropriate duration for a community responsibility order for a 17-year-old, and that they may be prepared to reconsider the matter and devise a more sophisticated instrument that would ensure that the maximum length of the order matched the age of the offender.

Des Browne: As the hon. Member for Reigate pointed out when we were debating an earlier set of amendments, the criminal justice review recommended that a form of community service should be developed for children aged under 16, and that it should be limited to a maximum duration of 40 hours. The community responsibility order has been developed in response to that recommendation. It provides for relevant instruction in citizenship, including programmes to address offending behaviour and victim awareness, and practical reparative activity, from repairing damage to helping at a school for the disabled.
 The order is aimed at younger children, although it is available for all, including those whose offending is relatively minor. That is why the Government have been flexible. The instruction element provides the essential context for, and a better understanding of, the reparative activity that follows. To increase the maximum hours from 40 to 240 would be excessively punitive and wholly disproportionate for the type of offenders and offences it is aimed at. The reparative nature of the order would be lost if it were unnecessarily onerous. Other community orders, such as a probation order or a community service order for those aged 16 and over are available for more serious or persistent offenders. 
 In those circumstances, I would ask the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment. If he is concerned about the pain of the knife, he knows that an offer was made by the Government to the Opposition to move it to a later time today, and that that offer was refused.

Crispin Blunt: As the Minister has chosen to bring the matter into the debate, it is appropriate for me to point out that we did not vote for the knives. The Government have got themselves into a mess and did not offer the Committee sufficient time for proper consideration of this part of the Bill. In light of the fact—

Derek Conway: Order. The Minister slipped that one in the back of the net rather quickly, so I have allowed the hon. Gentleman to respond for the sake of the record. I should be grateful if he would now return to amendment No. 309. Further issues will have to be raised on a point of order by hon. Members from any party.

Crispin Blunt: I am grateful for your guidance, Mr. Conway. I have listened to the Minister's arguments. Because the legislation will apply to 16 and 17-year-
 olds, the provision should be more flexible on community responsibility orders and community service orders, so that it can be applied proportionately. A 17-year-old receiving a responsibility order of this duration will think that he has got away with it. Part of the process in which we are engaged, particularly youth conferencing, is to get serious youth offenders to face up to their behaviour. If the limitations that can be placed on the orders arising from youth conferences enabled such 17-year-olds to be seen to be getting away with it, that would be a pity, and it would devalue the effect of the conferencing system. Perhaps we can rejoin that debate on Report. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Mark Francois: On a point of order, Mr. Conway. I wish to register my protest at what has happened. Earlier, you told us that we had to finish at 1 pm. Any minute now we shall spend 30 seconds on each group of amendments that we have not considered. There are 44 amendments, in 20 groups, left to consider in seven minutes. I am particularly disappointed because we shall not even reach a matter about which I spoke on Second Reading. I wish to place on record the fact that the Government have handled this very badly.

Chris Mole: It is not a point of order.

Derek Conway: Order. The hon. Gentleman's point of order was perfectly in order. I am sure that those who follow the Committee's proceedings will note what has been said. We move on to amendment No. 235.

Lembit Öpik: Given what has been said, I should like to point out that we were offered a lifting of the knife until later today, but it was Conservative Members, not the Liberal Democrats, who refused the offer. It should be made clear that the knife that we are discussing was kept in place by the Conservatives, not the Liberal Democrats.

Derek Conway: Order. The hon. Gentleman could have said that as a point of order, not when he was supposed to be moving amendment No. 235. If he wishes to move the amendment, he must do so now.

Crispin Blunt: On a point of order, Mr. Conway. It is wholly unacceptable that such inaccurate allegations should be flung around. Conservative Members do not oppose the lifting of the knife at 1 pm. We have argued throughout that the knife should not be used at all during our consideration of the Bill. We have wider issues to think of than the length of the Committee's consideration, but we are now running into the straightforward problem that the Government set for themselves. I would be grateful if the hon. Member for Montgomeryshire would withdraw his suggestion that Conservative Members oppose the removal of the knife at 1 pm, as it was his hon. Friend who voted for it.

Derek Conway: I have noted that point of order, but I am not aware of discussions that may have taken place between the usual channels as they do not take place on the Floor of the Committee. The hon. Member for Montgomeryshire made no
 unparliamentary remarks, and I am sure that he will now wish to return to the amendment.

Lembit Öpik: Further to that point of order, Mr. Conway. I wish to set the record straight. Let me speak about what I know. I was approached informally with regard to the knife, and I said that I had no objection to it being lifted. What happens between the Conservative party and the Government is their own affair, but Liberal Democrats were more than happy for the debate to be extended. It is disingenuous to suggest otherwise.

Derek Conway: I am grateful for the hon. Member's point of order. I make it clear that no request has been put to me by the Programming Sub-Committee.

Lembit Öpik: I beg to move amendment No. 235, in page 36, line 1, leave out ', as far as practicable,'.
 We do not believe that it is reasonable to say that one should try to avoid conflict with an offender's religious beliefs or not interfere with his normal work or education.

Andrew Turner: Does the hon. Gentleman recall that, during the Report stage of the recent Education Bill, the hon. Member for Harrogate and Knaresborough (Mr. Willis) complained at some length about people's practice of suddenly getting religion when they wanted their children to be admitted to a particular school? Is it not conceivable that people might get religion if they are the subject of instructions from the responsible officer under the clause?

Lembit Öpik: No, I do not recall that, and I would like to hear what the Minister has to say.

Des Browne: The hon. Gentleman knows that when the phrase, ''as far as practicable'' is used, it means that although every reasonable effort will be made to avoid the conflicts anticipated in the clause and interference with other aspects of a child's life, it may not always be possible to achieve that objective. The bottom line is that the child must comply with the terms of the community responsibility order imposed by the court. If the matter is unresolved or unresolvable, the responsible officer or the child can seek to have the order amended or revoked and replaced with another. Adequate provision is made for such circumstances.

Lembit Öpik: I understand the Minister's response. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Lembit Öpik: I beg to move amendment No. 237, in page 36, line 13, leave out 'may' and insert 'shall'.

Derek Conway: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following amendments: No. 238, in page 36, line 18, leave out 'may' and insert 'shall'.
 No. 249, in clause 56, page 41, line 16, leave out 'may' and insert 'shall'. 
 No. 253, in clause 57, page 44, line 12, leave out 'may' and insert 'shall'. 
 No. 254, in page 44, line 14, leave out 'may' and insert 'shall'. 
 No. 258, in clause 60, page 55, line 19, leave out 'may' and insert 'shall'.

Lembit Öpik: This group of amendments would make it mandatory for the Secretary of State to make rules to regulate both the treatment of young offenders and, to protect them, the circumstances in which they should carry out community responsibility orders. It would also make it mandatory for the Secretary of State to make rules to protect children under supervision, rules about the procedures for youth conferences and rules on monitoring offenders who are subject to orders. The amendments are probing. We want to know why the Government believe that the Secretary of State ''may'' do those things, and why they do not emphasise the mandatory nature of those rules.

Des Browne: As the hon. Gentleman recognises, we will need to make rules on all such matters if the orders are to work. The word ''may'' has been used in line with the usual drafting conventions. Making the orders mandatory would seem rather unnecessary, and the amendment makes no difference. I urge the hon. Gentleman to withdraw it.

Lembit Öpik: I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 It being One o'clock, The Chairman proceeded, pursuant to Sessional Order D [28 June 2001] and the Orders of the Committee [29 and 31 January 2002], to put forthwith the Questions necessary to dispose of the business to be concluded at that time. 
 Clause 55, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 56 - Custody care orders

Amendment made: No. 211, in page 42, line 6, leave out 'offender' and insert 'child'.—[Mr. Browne.] 
 Clause 56, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 57 - Youth conferences and youth conference plans

Amendment proposed: No. 255, in page 45, line 19, at end insert— 
'(8) A youth conference plan must contain details of provision for the child's education where the child is in receipt of education'.—[Lembit Öpik.]
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 1, Noes 16.

Question accordingly negatived. 
 Clause 57 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 58 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 59 - Court-ordered youth conferences

Amendments made: No. 212, in page 49, leave out line 33. 
 No. 213, in page 49, line 41, leave out 'or (b)'. 
 No. 214, in page 51, line 2, leave out 'or (b)'. 
 No. 215, in page 53, line 6, leave out 'must' and insert— 
'(a) where recommending that the court should exercise its powers by imposing a custodial sentence, must not specify what sort of custodial sentence the court should impose or for what period; and 
 (b) where recommending that the court should exercise its powers otherwise than by imposing a custodial sentence, may'.
 No. 216, in page 53, line 11, leave out from 'report' to 'the' in line 15 and insert— 
'(a) must not specify what sort of custodial sentence the court should impose or for what period; but 
 (b) must include details of'.—[Mr. Browne.]
 Clause 59, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 60 - Youth conference orders

Amendment made: No. 217, in page 54, line 15, leave out 
'either the recommended custodial sentence or another'
 and insert 'any'.—[Mr. Browne.] 
 Clause 60, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 61 and 62 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Schedule 10 agreed to. 
 Clause 63 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Schedule 11 agreed to. 
 Clauses 64 and 65 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Adjourned at four minutes past One o'clock till this day at half-past Four o'clock.